RAMS

ALD Compliance with SAE 4754A: 

• SAE J4754A is a standard developed by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) that outlines the functional safety requirements for automotive electronic systems. considering the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. This includes validation of requirements, verification of the design implementation for certification and product assurance. SAE J4754A provides guidelines for ensuring the functional safety of automotive electronic systems. The guidelines in this document were developed in the context of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) Part 25 and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Certification Specification (CS) CS-25. It may be applicable to other regulations, such as Parts 23, 27, 29, 33, and 35 (CS-23, CS-27, CS-29, CS-E, CS-P). This document addresses the development cycle for aircraft and systems that implement aircraft functions. It does not include specific coverage of detailed software or electronic hardware development, safety assessment processes, in-service safety activities, aircraft structural development nor does it address the development of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) or Configuration Deviation List (CDL). 

• When it comes to the software aspects of aircraft certification under Title 14 CFR Part 25 and EASA Certification Specifications, there are specific guidelines and standards that address the design, development, and certification of software used in aircraft systems. Here's a more detailed coverage: 

• Title 14 CFR Part 25.1309: Part 25 of the CFR outlines requirements for the installation of electronic equipment and systems in aircraft, including software. Section 25.1309 specifically addresses system and equipment installation requirements, including software, to ensure that they are reliable and function properly. 

• RTCA/DO-178C: This is a document produced by RTCA, Incorporated, a private, not-for-profit association in the United States, titled "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification." It provides guidelines for the development of software used in airborne systems, including aircraft. DO-178C establishes safety-related software development processes and defines levels of software criticality (DAL A through E) based on their impact on aircraft safety. 

• EASA ED-12B/DO-178C: EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) has adopted ED-12B, which is essentially the European equivalent of RTCA/DO-178C. It provides similar guidance for the certification of software in airborne systems, aligning with the requirements of EASA Certification Specifications. 

• DO-254: Also known as "Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware," this document complements DO-178C/ED-12B by providing guidelines for the development and certification of complex electronic hardware used in airborne systems. It addresses the hardware aspects of avionics systems, including programmable logic devices (PLDs) and application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). 

• EASA ED-80/ARP4754A: ED-80 is the European equivalent of ARP4754A, which provides guidance on the development of aircraft and systems. While not specific to software, it addresses the overall system development process, including the integration of software and hardware components into aircraft systems. 

• Software Development Process: Both regulatory frameworks emphasize the importance of establishing a rigorous software development process that includes requirements analysis, design, implementation, verification, and validation. This process must adhere to the principles of safety, reliability, and traceability. 

• Certification Process: The certification process for software in aircraft involves demonstrating compliance with the applicable regulations and standards through documentation, testing, and analysis. This includes documenting software requirements, architecture, design, verification, validation, and configuration management processes. 

• Design guidance and certification considerations for integrated modular avionics are provided by appropriate RTCA/EUROCAE document DO-297/ED-124. Methodologies for safety assessment processes are outlined in SAE document ARP4761, 'Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment'. Details for in-service safety assessment are found in ARP5150, 'Safety Assessment of Transport Airplanes In Commercial Service' and ARP5151 'Safety Assessment of General Aviation Airplanes and Rotorcraft In Commercial Service'. Post-certification activities (modification to a certified product) are covered in section 6 of this document. The regulations and processes used to develop and approve the MMEL vary throughout the world. Guidance for the development of the MMEL should be requested from the local airworthiness authority. 

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ALD Safety Services for System Certification Process FAR/CS 25.1309: 

• AR/CS 25.1309-1A refers to a specific section of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and Certification Specifications (CS) that addresses the requirements for the installation of systems and equipment in transport category airplanes. These means are intended to provide guidance for the experienced engineering and operational judgment that must form the basis for compliance findings. They are not mandatory. Other means may be used if they show compliance with this section of the FAR. 

• Section 25.1309(b) is a specific subsection of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 25, which outlines the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. provides general requirements for a logical and acceptable inverse relationship between the probability and the severity of each failure condition, and section 25.1309(d) requires that compliance be shown primarily by an analysis. Section 25.1309(c) provides general requirements for system monitoring, failure warning, and capability for appropriate corrective action by the crew. Because section 25.1309(b) and (c) is a regulation of general applicability, it may not be used to replace or alter any allowed design practices or specific requirements of Part 25, and each requirement of 25.l309(b) and (c) applies only if other applicable sections of Part 25 do not provide a specific system requirement that has a similar purpose. While section 25.1309(b) and (c) does not apply to the performance, flight characteristic and structural loads and strength requirements of Subparts B and C, it does apply to any system on which compliance with any of those requirements is based. For example, it does not apply to an airplane's inherent stall characteristics or their evaluation, but it does apply to a stall warning system used to enable compliance with 25.207. These standards cover a wide range of requirements related to the design, construction, performance, and operation of aircraft to ensure their safety and reliability. A brief description is provided in Paragraph 5. Section 25.1309(b) and (c) sets forth certain objective safety requirements based on this design concept. Many systems, equipment, and their installations have been successfully evaluated with regards to the applicable requirements of Part 25, including 25.1309(b), (c), and (d), without using structured means for safety assessments. However, in recent years there has been an increase in the degree of system complexity and integration, and in the number of safety-critical functions performed by systems. Difficulties had been experienced in assessing the hazards that could result from failures of such systems or adverse interactions among them. These difficulties led to the use of structured means for showing compliance with 25.1309(b). For this and other reasons, there is a need in guidance on acceptable means of compliance with 25.1309(b), (c), and (d). 

• ALD System Certification process (TC-Type certification for aviation) is awarded by aviation regulating bodies to aerospace manufacturers after it has been established that the particular 

• design of a civil aircraft, engine, or propeller has met the regulating bodies' current prevailing airworthiness requirements for the safe conduct of flights under all normally conceivable conditions, Aircraft produced under a type of certified design are issued a standard Airworthiness Certificate. A Type Certificate (TC) is a design approval issued by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) of a given country (such as the US FAA and EU EASA) when the applicant demonstrates that a product complies with the applicable regulations. The TC normally includes the type design, the operating limitations, the Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS), the applicable regulations, and other conditions or limitations prescribed by the CAA. Since the TC is a foundation for other approvals, including production and airworthiness approvals, ALD Services will guide and support you through the entire certification processes. 

 

Aviation Safety Management System: 

• With the expected growth in air transportation, there is a need to make greater efforts and adopt new measures to continue improving aviation safety. An Aviation Safety Management System (SMS) is a systematic approach to managing safety within an aviation organization. It's a structured and proactive process that aims to identify, assess, and mitigate risks to aviation safety. 

• Several leading regulatory aviation agencies have indeed issued guidelines for the establishment of Safety Management Systems (SMS) at airports. These guidelines provide airports with a structured framework for implementing an SMS to enhance safety performance and mitigate risks. Some of the prominent regulatory aviation agencies that have issued SMS guidelines for airports include: 

• International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): ICAO has developed standards and recommended practices (SARPs) for the implementation of SMS at airports. These standards are outlined in Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which focuses on safety management. 

• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): The FAA has issued Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-37, "Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Airport Operators," which provides guidance to airport operators on establishing and implementing SMS at airports in the United States. 

• Main goals of a safety management process are as follows: Identifying Hazards: The safety management process aims to identify potential hazards and risks within the organization's operations, activities, and infrastructure. This involves systematically assessing the workplace, processes, equipment, and human factors to identify potential sources of harm to people, property, or the environment. 

• Assessing Risks: Once hazards are identified, the safety management process involves assessing the associated risks to determine their likelihood and potential consequences. This helps prioritize risks based on their severity and likelihood of occurrence, allowing organizations to focus their resources on mitigating the most significant risks first. 

• Monitoring Performance: The safety management process includes monitoring and measuring safety performance indicators to track progress, identify trends, and assess the effectiveness of risk controls. This allows organizations to identify areas for improvement and take corrective actions to address deficiencies in their safety management systems. 

• Establishing a formal reporting procedure within the airline management is an important element of each SMS that allows monitoring the level of safety performance achieved throughout the organization, being aware of every possible threat or risk and taking appropriate corrective action to minimize those risks. This requires comprehensive availability of operational data and means for analysing this data. 

 

SAE ARP 4761: 

• SAE ARP 4761 is a widely recognized industry guideline developed by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) for the application of safety assessment processes in the civil aerospace industry. The ARP 4761 document describes guidelines and methods of performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. It is primarily associated with showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309. The methods outlined here identify a systematic means, but not the only means, to show compliance. A subset of this material may be applicable to non-25.1309 equipment. The concept of Aircraft Level Safety Assessment is introduced and the tools to accomplish this task are outlined. The overall aircraft operating environment is considered. When aircraft derivatives or system changes are certified, the processes described herein are usually applicable only to the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by the changes. In the case of the implementation of existing designs in a new derivation, alternative means such as service experience may be used to show compliance. ARP 4761, titled "Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment," presents comprehensive guidelines for conducting safety assessments throughout the development lifecycle of civil airborne systems and equipment. conducting an industry accepted safety assessment consisting of Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and System Safety Assessment (SSA). This document also presents information on the safety analysis methods needed to conduct the safety assessment. These methods include the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagram (DD), Markov Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES) and Common Cause Analysis (CCA). [CCA is composed of Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risks Analysis (PRA), and Common Mode Analysis (CMA)]. 

• The guidelines and methods provided in ARP 4761 document are intended to be used in conjunction with other applicable guidance materials, including ARP4754, RTCA/DO-178, RTCA SC-180 Document DO-(TBD), and with the advisory material associated with FAR/JAR 25.1309. (For engines and propeller applications, reference the applicable FAR/JAR advisory material.) The intent of ARP 4761 document is to identify typical activities, methods, and documentation that may be used in the performance of safety assessments for civil aircraft and their associated systems and equipment. The specific application of such activities needs to be established by the organization conducting the assessment and the appropriate recipient. 

 

 

Safety Assessment: 

• Safety assessment is a systematic process used to identify, analyze, and mitigate potential hazards and risks associated with various aspects of operations, products, or systems. It is an essential component of safety management systems (SMS) and is used across industries to ensure the safety and wellbeing of individuals, assets, and the environment. 

• The purpose of Safety Assessment is to provide and assure the following: That all risks and hazards associated with the system functional faults are definitely identified (safety status). • That the system interfaces and integration with the system meets overall safety requirements. • That the system's end user be cognizant with the identified risks in operating and maintaining the system. Safety Assessment is described and required by different safety standards like MIL-STD-882C, DI-SAFT-80102A, MIL-STD-1472, SAE ARP 4761, FAR/CS 25.1309, SAE 4754A and other documents. 

• System Safety Assessment may be performed at Design, Production and Field use phases of the product. It is especially important for mission-critical and safety-critical products of aviation, aerospace, and defence industries. 

• The Safety Assessment Analysis includes several key components aimed at identifying, analyzing, and mitigating potential hazards and risks. Hazard Identification 

• Risk Assessment 

• Risk Identification 

• Risk Analysis Techniques 

• Safety Controls Evaluation 

• ALD provides all major Safety Assessment Services (System Safety Assessment - SSA, Preliminary Hazard Analysis - PHA, Functional Hazard Analysis - FHA, Master Minimal Equipment List Analysis - MMEL, Fault Tree Analysis - FTA and more). ALD also provides a Computerized Safety Assessment Software Tool - RAM Commander. 

 

 

Safety Analysis: 

• ALD products and services are dedicated to aircraft system-of-systems and system safety. 

• ALD provides a "one stop solution" for continuous safety and reliability of sophisticated systems and systems-of-systems for Aerospace, Railway, Defence, etc. 

• ALD supports its customers through the entire Safety Assessment process: Hazard Identification: ALD begins by systematically identifying potential hazards within the system, process, or operation under consideration. This may involve reviewing designs, conducting inspections, analyzing historical data, and engaging stakeholders to identify all potential sources of harm. 

• Risk Assessment: Once hazards are identified, ALD assesses the associated risks by evaluating the likelihood and consequences of potential hazards occurring. This includes analyzing the severity of potential consequences, the likelihood of occurrence, and the effectiveness of existing controls in place. 

• Risk Analysis Techniques: ALD may employ various risk analysis techniques to assess identified risks, such as fault tree analysis (FTA), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), event tree analysis (ETA), or probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). These techniques help identify the causes of hazards, their potential consequences, and the effectiveness of existing risk controls. 

• Safety Controls Evaluation: ALD evaluates the effectiveness of existing safety controls and mitigation measures in place to address identified risks. This involves assessing whether the controls are adequate, properly implemented, and capable of reducing the likelihood and severity of potential hazards. 

• Mitigation Strategies: Based on the results of the risk analysis, ALD develops and implements mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the identified risks. This may involve recommending engineering controls, administrative controls, training programs, or other measures to prevent accidents, injuries, or environmental damage. 

• Monitoring and Review: Safety analysis is an ongoing process, and ALD ensures continuous monitoring and review to maintain safety standards and make improvements as needed. Regular safety audits, inspections, and incident investigations help identify new hazards or emerging risks and evaluate the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. 

• Documentation and Reporting: ALD maintains proper documentation to record the results of safety analysis, including hazards identified, risks assessed, and mitigation measures implemented. This documentation helps track safety performance, demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements, and communicate safety information to stakeholders effectively. 

• As part of the safety assessment program, ALD provides its customers with a comprehensive Reliability and Safety Database, which complies with safety standards such as SAE APR4761, SAE 4754A, FAR/CS 25.1309, FAR/CS 27.1309, FAR/CS 23.1309, and other documents. 

• ALD is a world leader in Safety and Mission Assurance and has performed hundreds of Safety projects for some of the world leading organizations. 

• ALD guarantees the SSA process to be timely, well documented for regulatory authorities and easily reproducible for your next project or modification.